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evant inferences noted. This is, I grant, one reason why logical probabilities are only partially accessible, but not an objection if that is granted.
The other objection is that, where the ground for the belief in question
(that P) is not an experience but itself a belief (that J), then the adequacy
of the grounds for P should not be identified with Prob (P /J) for it also
depends on the adequacy of J. I fail to see this as an objection. The standard formula would have it that the adequacy of the ground for P in these
circumstances is the logical probability Prob (P&J/E) where E is the total,
or the relevant, experience.
The third criticism follows from the way that, for good reasons, Alston
explicates reliability not in terms of known frequency, or even actual frequency, but the frequency in a large run of actual or possible cases (p. 134).
I interpret him as offering a counterfactual frequency account of reliability: what would occur if there were a large number of cases. But, precisely
because this is a probabilistic situation, there is no fact of the matter as to
what would occur. So we need an amendment: the reliability of a beliefforming process is the frequency of truths that would probably occur if
there were a large number of occurrences of the type of process in question. What sort of probability is this though? It cannot itself be analyzed as
reliability on pain of circularity. And it had better be objective if epistemology is to have teeth. It must be logical probability.
The point of these three criticisms is that we need not despair of a traditional epistemology, concerned with accessible means to be used when
the end, truth, is not directly accessible. Within such an epistemology the
truth-conducive epistemic desiderata, as expounded by Alston, playa
key role.

Can God Be Free? by William L. Rowe. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004. Pp. vii + 173. $45.00 (Hardback).
MICHAEL ALMEIDA, University of Texas at San Antonio
William Rowe's Can God be Free? is a nicely conceived and extremely
well-written work. The focus on crucial conceptual relations between
essential perfect goodness, divine freedom, divine responsibility, worship and praise has occupied Rowe's work for the last twelve years and
the argumentation in Can Cod Be Free? is subtle and very polished. In
chapter 1 Rowe provides some background on the famous series of exchanges between Gottfried Leibniz and Samuel Clarke on divine freedom
and perfection. But Rowe's main focus in chapter (1) is to rebut Leibniz's
well-known attempt to reconcile divine perfection and freedom. Leibniz's
well-known proposal was that God both necessarily and freely actualized the best possible world. Rowe offers an interesting proof that this
proposal cannot be true. Rowe's response takes the form of a simple twopremise argument.
1. If God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, then He
chooses to create the best possible world.
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2. God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise, and perfectly good.
3. Therefore, God chooses to create the best of all possible worlds.
There is no question that for Leibniz premise (2) is absolutely or metaphysically necessary. Rowe's main line of argumentation is to show that
Leibniz is also committed to the absolute necessity of (1). Here's Rowe.
[I]f we suppose that God chooses to create less than the best ... it
would logically follow that he is lacking in wisdom, goodness or
power. Indeed Leibniz says that 'to do less good than one could is
to be lacking in wisdom or goodness', that the most perfect understanding' cannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and consequently
to choose the best' (Theodicy, p. 252) .... What Leibniz says about
moral necessity implies that (1) is absolutely necessary. For he clearly
holds that from the fact that a being does less good than it could it
logically follows that the being in question is lacking in wisdom and
goodness. And one cannot hold this without being committed to
holding that the consequent of (1) ... logically follows from the antecedent of (1). (17-18)
The argument is exactly what we might expect in response to Leibniz's
proposal. Suppose Rowe is right that (1) and (2) express absolutely necessary propositions. It follows that (3) is also absolutely necessary. But
importantly it does not follow that God could not have actualized a world
other than our own. To reach that conclusion Rowe must assume that
whatever is morally necessary is necessarily morally necessary. In short he
must assume that the same moral standards (or broader standards, if you
like) hold in every possible world. Certainly if the same moral standards
hold in every possible world, then given the absolute necessity of (1) and
(2), God could not have created a world different from our own. But suppose that moral standards might have been different. The best one can
do relative to the standards of a mercy world might demand making exceptions to the requirements of justice. The best one can do relative to a
justice world might demand no exceptions to the requirements of justice.
If moral standards vary from world to world then what constitutes the
best possible world will vary from world to world. There is no absolute
ordering of worlds from the standpoint of every world. The actual world
might therefore be the best possible world but not necessarily the best possible world. But then God might have actualized another. And this seems
consistent with Leibniz's official position that the Principle of the Best is a
contingent truth.
Rowe focuses in chapter 2 on Samuel Clarke, divine perfection and
freedom. Rowe argues that Clarke's account places severe limitations on
God's freedom. Here is Rowe.
Clarke readily sees that were a perfectly good, omniscient being to
freely choose to do some evil deed, it would thereby cease to be perfectly good .... For the free choice to do evil is itself inconsistent with
continuing to be a perfectly good, omniscient being. A being who
freely chooses to do what it knows to be an evil deed thereby ceases
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to be a perfectly good being. So if God were to freely choose to do an
evil deed, he would cease to be perfectly good. In short, it is not logically possible for God both to freely choose to do evil and to continue
to be perfectly good. (p. 26)
Since God has the traditional attributes of perfect beings Rowe concludes
that it is impossible that God should choose to perform an evil action. But
it is not at all clear why Rowe urges that" a being who freely chooses to
do what it knows to be an evil deed thereby ceases to be a perfectly good
being"(p. 26). Certainly in ordinary moral contexts no one would make
EoUch a claim. Suppose a being freely chooses to do what it knows to be an
evil deed because it necessarily faces a moral dilemma. If an agent necessarily faces a moral dilemma then there is nothing the agent could have
done to avoid the dilemma. Indeed there is nothing that an omnipotent
being could have done to avoid the dilemma. The agent must choose some
wrong action or other. It is difficult to see how the agent's choice might
nonetheless be blameworthy or how that choice might reflect poorly on
his character. Since blamelessly choosing to do wrong does not diminish
moral perfection at all, it cannot be assumed that necessarily a perfect being does not choose to do wrong.
Much of the discussion in chapter 3 focuses on how an infinite series of
possible worlds might be increasingly better on the assumption that God
necessarily exists and is necessarily infinitely valuable. The focus is primarily on why St. Thomas Aquinas thought so. There is also some muchneeded discussion of the principle of plenitude as an account of value. Are
worlds better and worse in accordance with the kind and variety of beings
they contain? Or should a perfect being prefer just the most valuable beings? Nothing definitive on the possibility of infinitely many improving
worlds is established, as might be expected. But the stage is set for considering God's freedom under the assumption that for each world in an
infinite sequence there is a better actualizable world.
Chapters 4 and 5 consider respectively the subtle defense of compatiblism in Jonathan Edwards and the much-discussed argument that God
might create a less-than-best world in Robert M. Adams. The discussion
leads directly to Rowe's most recent and fascinating work in chapter 6.
The contemporary debate in chapter 6 considers the possibility that
God actualizes some world under the No Best World hypothesis. Rowe's
formulation of the hypothesis states that "for any world creatable by God
(if he exists) there is a better world he could create instead"(p. 88). The
basic assumption is that there is an infinite sequence of possible worlds
and for any possible world in the sequence there is some better actualizable world in the sequence. More precisely for any possible world in the
sequence wn there is some better world wn+ that an essentially omnipotent,
essentially omniscient, and necessarily e~isting being (OON) can actualize. The No Best World hypothesis is best formulated in (1).
1.

D(VO)(Vx)(3y)«x < y) & 0(0 actualizes y))

The variable 0 has as a domain the (possibly empty) set of OON's. The
variables x and y have as a domain the set of possible worlds in the infinite
sequence of worlds and 0 and 0 express logical necessity and possibility.
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The proposition in (1) does not entail that there are OON's in any world
and so a fortiori does not entail that there is a perfect being in any world.
Further (1) does not entail that any being actualizes any possible world
in the sequence. And (1) is perfectly consistent with the actual world being the product of pure chance. So there is no strong objection to the No
Best World hypothesis as formulated in (1). But (1) together with Rowe's
Principle B entails that an essentially perfectly good being actualizes no
world in the sequence. Principle B states that necessarily if an omniscient
being actualizes a world when there is a better world that it could have
actualized, then that omniscient being is not essentially perfectly good. l
The proposition expressed in Principle B is (2).
2.

O(\fO)(\fx)«O is essentially perfectly good) & (0 actualizes x)) ::::)
-(:3y)«x < y) & 0(0 actualizes y)).

Rowe urges that in addition to (1) and (2) it is also true that a perfect being
must actualize some world in the sequence.
3.

O(VO)(:3x)«O is essentially perfectly good) ::::) (0 actualizes x))

And it does follow from (1)-(3) that it is impossible that there is an essentially perfectly good being.
4.

0-(:30)(0 is essentially perfectly good)

Rowe addresses some published objections to this argument from
Thomas Morris, William Wainwright, Dan and Frances Howard-Snyder
and William Hasker. And Rowe's responses are in general compelling. But
there remains a serious problem for Rowe's argument. It is a theorem in
every normal system of deontic logic that O«OA & OB) ::::) O(A & B)). The
theorem states that, necessarily, an agent is obligated to do each A and B
only if the agent can do both A and B. The theorem is considerably stronger
than the familiar ought-can principle and, more importantly, it is a direct consequence of the thesis that, necessarily, every essentially perfectly
good being fulfills all of his obligations or O(OA ::J A). And there is no
question that Rowe endorses O(OA::::) A) as a theorem governing essentially perfectly good beings.
The problem is that Principle B generates a set of obligations that violate the theorem O«OA & OB) ::J O(A & B). Since no moral principle can
generate a set of moral obligations that violate any theorem, it follows
that Principle B must be false. Let Aa, AI' ... , A= express the propositions
that an essentially perfectly good being actualizes respectively w a' WI' .
. . , W =' Principle B generates the following set of obligations (0-Aa & 0Al & ... & 0- AJ or it is obligatory that an essentially perfectly good
being does not actualize w a' it is obligatory that an essentially perfectly
good being does not actualize w] and so on for every world in the sequence. Instantiating the theorem we get 0 [(0-Ao & 0- A] & ... & 0AJ ::::) O(-Aa & -AI & ... & -AJ]. But it is impossible that an essentially
perfectly good being fails to actualize every world in the sequence and
so -O(-Ao & -AI & ... & -AJ. Principle B therefore yields a set of obligations that violates this theorem. But no moral principle can generate a
set of obligations that violates a deontic theorem. Therefore, the principle is false.
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One obvious remedy for Rowe is to give priority to his moral principle over the theorem O((OA & OB) :=J O(A & B)). But the consequences
of abandoning this theorem are drastic. First, Rowe would also have to
abandon the thesis O(OA :=J A).2 But this is just to concede that an essentially perfectly good being might fail to fulfill a moral obligation. Rowe
would almost certainly not find that consequence acceptable. But matters
are worse. The theorem O((OA & OB) :=J O(A & B)) is also entailed by the
familiar axiom that nothing impossible is obligatory OA :=J OA together
with the closure principle O((OA & OB) :=J O(A & B)). So conceding O(OA
=J A) is not enough, we have to give up an additional theorem.
It is less damaging to abandon the closure principle. But in that case no inconsistency follows from the assumption that an essentially perfectly good
being has the moral obligations (i) O-Ao& 0- Al & ... & 0- A= and (ii) O(Ao
v Al v ... v AJ. From (i) it follows that an essentially perfectly good being
has a moral obligation not to actualize any world in the sequence and from
(ii) it follows that an essentially perfectly good being has a moral obligation
to actualize some world or other in the sequence. An essentially perfectly
good being therefore faces a moral dilemma. Indeed an essentially perfectly
good being necessarily faces a moral dilemma. But abandoning the closure
principle entails that moral dilemmas are perfectly possible. So none of this
entails that there exists no essentially perfectly good beings.
If there is an infinite sequence of improving worlds then two conclusions are available. Either an essentially perfectly good being must fulfill
all of its moral obligations (i.e., O(OA :=J A) is a theorem) and Principle B
is false or Principle B is true and an essentially perfectly good being need
not fulfill all of its moral obligations. In neither case are we forced to the
conclusion that there exists no essentially perfectly good being.
In the final chapter of Can God Be Free? Rowe considers a suggestion
from Thomas Morris that God is the "delimiter of possible worlds." The
suggestion promises a solution to many of the problems Rowe advances.
Perhaps only those worlds are possible that are consistent with the necessary existence of an essentially perfectly good being. If an infinite sequence
of improving worlds is inconsistent with a perfect being, then there is no
infinite sequence. And if a best possible world is inconsistent with divine
freedom, then there are many equally good and unsurpassed worlds. This
is a solution that Rowe finds appealing, if not entirely satisfactory. But
the argument for Morris's position is one worth worrying about. If w is a
possible world that is on-balance bad and God is a necessarily existing,
essentially perfectly good being, then it is necessarily possible that God
actualizes w. So the fact that God can actualize w does not diminish God's
essential perfect goodness unless there is a moral requirement that God do
the impossible, viz., render himself unable to actualize w. But there cannot be a moral requirement that God do the impossible. So we might well
conclude instead that the fact that God can actualize w does not diminish
God's essential perfect goodness.
NOTES
1. Rowe introduces Principle B as stating that if an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world it could have created, then it is pos-
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sible that there exists a being morally better than it. (91) But the consequent
entails that the omniscient being is not essentially perfectly good. And Rowe
contends that the principle expresses a necessary truth. These modifications
facilitate presentation of Rowe's argument.
2. Well, strictly he would have to give up (OA:J A) or (A:J OA). But it is
hard to imagine anyone contending that some actual states of affairs are also
impossible.

Science and the Study of God: A Mutuality Model for Theology and Science, by
Alan G. Padgett. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003. Pp. 224. $22.00 (paper).
Divine Action and Modern Science, by Nicholas Saunders. Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 234. $22.00 (paper).

PATRICK RICHMOND, St Catharine's College, Cambridge, UK
These two books deal with the relation of science to theology, one concentrating more on broad outlines and methodology, the other on a specific topic.
Both take Christian faith as a given, at least provisionally, and both note that
Christian faith sees science as investigating God's creation, so science and
theology are both concerned with understanding the same cosmos.
Proceeding from this basic perspective, Padgett develops a collegial
metaphor of mutuality, sketching what he terms" dialectical realism" between science and theology. Science and theology should both inform and
be informed by our worldview, our basic framework for life that helps
us understand the world and motivates our practice as well. Our worldview can affect the way we interpret the data and conclusions of academic
disciplines. This "mutuality model" sees science and theology as more
intimately related than mere dialogue partners but as still distinct and not
fully integrated academic disciplines.
Padgett points out that many claims that science and religion are incompatible incorrectly assume that science is a world view or that it presupposes a naturalistic worldview. In fact, science arose from a Christian
intellectual environment: even Galileo was not antireligious.
Padgett argues for the existence of various levels of explanation, with
disciplines like history using explanations that presuppose those used in
the social and physical sciences. Theology likewise includes explanatory
claims, such as that God somehow explains the existence of the cosmos.
He argues that in the right circumstances one's worldview, including religious commitments, can rationally help one choose among various theories that are equally supported by the data and standards of other disciplines. Although the truth must be sought in each science according to the
traditions of enquiry of that discipline, results in one field may be called
into question by those in another if they do not cohere, as indeed happens
amongst the sciences from time to time.
Next, Padgett argues for "dialectical realism." We learn in a community
with a history and tradition. As with many post-modem approaches, there
is a suspicion of grand systems and an attention to the particular and exceptional. Padgett also argues for critical realism in both theology and science.

